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Statement Showing Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals, under §78A-4-
103, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), to hear appeals from district court in-
volving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, 
property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and pa-
ternity. 
Statement of the Issues. 
First Issue: What is the standard required in order to modify a prior order of the 
court, and must the court return to the original decree, if there have been subse-
quent modifications of that original decree? 
Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3); Krambule v. Krambule, 994 P.2d 
210 (Utah App. 1999), Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Wil-
liamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219,5 8, 983 P.2d 1103; and Bolliger v. Bol-
liger, 2000 UT App 47, J 11, 997 P.2d 903. See also, Diener v. Diener, 98 P.3d 
1178, 508 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2004 UT App 314, and Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 86 
P.3d767,2004UTApp37. 
Standard of Review: "The determination to modify a divorce decree is gen-
erally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 
UT App 236,5 20, 9 P.3d 171. However, 4[q]uestions about the legal adequacy of 
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues 
of law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court.' 
In re C.K., 2000 UT App 11,11 17, 996 P.2d 1059. " Van Dyke, 86 P.3d at 769, 
2004 UT App al 5 9. This Court reviews, "the district court's decision for correct-
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ness to the extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation." Diener, 98 P.3d 
at 1180,5 4. This Court reviews, "the district court's decision for correctness to the 
extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation." Diener, 98P.3d at 1180,5 
4. This Court reviews, "the determination to modify a divorce decree for an abuse 
of discretion, insofar as that determination is based on a conclusion of law, we re-
view it for correctness." Krambule, 994 P.2d at 213, \ 10. 
Second Issue: When one party's filing of a bankruptcy was previously raised in a 
trial, can the trial court use that same bankruptcy filing, in a subsequent trial, to 
modify those prior orders, or is that action barred under the doctrine of res judi-
cata! 
Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3), and 78B-12-217, Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended); Huish v. Munroy 191 P.3d 1242, 2008 UT App 283; Diener, 
98 P.3d 1178, 508 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2004 UT App 314, Wan Dyke, 86 P.3d 767, 
2004 UT App 37; and Maoris & Associates v. Neways, Inc, 16 P.3d 1214 (Ujtah 
2000). 
Standard of Review: "The determination to modify a divorce decree is gen-
erally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 
UT App 236,J 20, 9 P.3d 171. However, '[questions about the legal adequacy of 
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues 
of law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court.' 
In re C.K., 2000 UT App 11,11 17, 996 P.2d 1059. " Van Dyke, 86 P.3d at 769, 
2004 UT App 3 5 9. This Court reviews, "the determination to modify a divorce 
decree for an abuse of discretion, insofar as that determination is based on a con-
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elusion of law, we review it for correctness." Krambule, 994 P.2d, at 213, f 10. 
Third Issue: Was there a material change in circumstances of the parties, to war-
rant a change in the ongoing child support obligation, and can that change be ap-
plied retroactively to a date earlier than when a petition, or request for a change 
was made? 
Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3), §78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended), and §78B-12-112(4), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
See also, Black v. Black, 199 P.3d 371 2008 UT App 465; Wall v. Wall, 157 P.3d 
341, 2007 UT App 61; Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, UT App 318 (UT App. 2001); 
and, Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (UT App. 1994). 
Standard of review: The Court of Appeals reviews, "a trial court's statutory 
interpretations under a correction of error standard with no deference to the trial 
court." Black, 199 P.3d at 373, 2008 UT App 465, 5f 7. 
"The determination to modify a divorce decree is generally reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard. However, questions about the legal adequacy of 
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues 
of law, which we review for correctness." Wall, 157 P.3d at 342, 2007 UT App 
61,5 7 (quotations and citations omitted). See also, Diener, 98 P.3d at 1180,5 4. 
Fourth Issue: Was there a material change in circumstances of the parties suffi-
cient to warrant requiring a reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of Petitioner's reason-
able school expenses? 
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Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3), and 78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended). See also, Brooks, 881 P.2d 955. 
Standard of Review: 'The determination to modify a divorce decree is gen-
erally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 
UT App 236,5 20, 9 P.3d 171. However, 4[q]uestions about the legal adequacy of 
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues 
of law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court.' 
In re C.K., 2000 UT App 11,11 17, 996 P.2d 1059. " Van Dyke, 86 P.3d at 769, 
2004 UT App 37,5 9. 
Fifth Issue: Was there a material change in circumstances of the parties sufficient 
to warrant requiring that any required reimbursement be paid, without the request-
ing party having to show that he, or she, paid the underlying bill? 
Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3), 78B-12-212, and 78B-12-214, Utah 
Code Annot. (1953, as amended). See also, Brooks, 881 P.2d 955. 
Standard of review: "The determination to modify a divorce decree is gen-
erally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. However, questions about 
the legal adequacy of findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's 
statements present issues of law, which we review for correctness." Wall, 157 P.3d 
at 342, 2007 UT App 61, $ 7 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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Statement on Preservation of Issue: 
"
4[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue 
in the trial court' giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." Searle v. 
Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 313 (Utah App. 2001), citations omitted. 
The Trial Court had ample opportunity to rule on the issues raised in this ap-
peal. The Trial Court stated that it had, "fully reviewed the file since the last bench 
trial on a petition to modify." Transcript at p. 1, lines 13-14. It was at that, "last 
bench trial", that the Trial Court heard evidence of Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy, 
and the impact it had on Ms Davis. See, the 2005 Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, hereinafter, "2005 Findings of Fact", 5 13, 15 - 19, and 28. Record at pp. 
530, 529, and 527, respectively. See also, Transcript at p. 24, lines 4 - 9 . That, 
"last bench trial", was the trial held on April 21, 2005, hereinafter referred to as 
the, "2005 Trial". Record at 630 - 633. 
At the January 28, 2010, trial, hereinafter the, "2010 Trial", the Trial Court 
noted that Mr. Davis filed a bankruptcy in 2003, and had not filed another bank-
ruptcy subsequent thereto. Transcript at p. 23, lines 11 — 16, and p. 57, lines 20 — 
23. In fact, the Court noted that, "[o]n the issue of bankruptcy - since the bank-
ruptcy was filed in 2003 and since you had a bench trial in 2005, any issues relating 
to the effect of the bankruptcy should have been brought up at that trial, because I -
my reading is the judge actually put in his findings and decree something about the 
bankruptcy." Transcript at p. 24, lines 4 — 9, and at p. 29, lines 1—7. The Trial 
Court again noted that the issues relating to the bankruptcy were heard at the 2005 
trial, but that Ms Davis was alleged subsequent impacts to her life. Transcript, at p. 
108, lines 8 - 16. 
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Additionally, Mr. Davis raised the res judicata issue in his Answer to Petition 
for Modification. Record at 566. Mr. Davis specifically stated that, "Petitioner's 
Petition to Modify is repetitive of the issues previously brought before this court and 
were discussed at the time of the last trial (held April 2005)..." Answer to Petition 
for Modification, 5 2. Record at 566. Mr. Davis then expounded on his claim, point 
for point, addressing the 2003 Bankruptcy, money for expenses, and the use of the 
children for tax exemptions. Record at 564 - 565. 
The tax issue, that of the award of the children for tax purposes, was modified 
at the 2005 Trial as well. Transcript at p. 28, lines 17 — 23, and p. 30, lines 1-8. 
See also, 2005 Findings of Fact, $ 28, and 2005 Order, J 16, record at 527, and 
535, respectively. In the instant matter, Ms Davis' whole theory was that, because 
of Mr. Davis' bankruptcy, it was only fair that she be awarded all of the children as 
tax exemptions. Transcript at p. 94, lines 3 — 14. 
Mr. Davis argued that he should not be required to pay additional fees, or 
costs, for the children's school, or other such related expenses; his child support 
covers all such obligations. Transcript at p. 31, line 21 through p. 32, line 25. 
The record shows that Ms Davis admitted that ORS would not adjust the on-
going child support, and that any such change did not exceed ten percent (10%). 
Transcript at p. 52, line 18, through p. 53, line 3, and p. 78, line 23, through p. 79, 
line 7. See also, Mr. Davis' Exhibit #3. 
Mr. Davis also brought to the Trial Court's attention his claims that, for pur-
poses of reimbursement of expenses, Ms Davis should show proof that she paid 
those expenses. Transcript, at p. 13, line 9, through p. 14, line 13. 
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Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules. 
Constitution: No determinative constitutional provisions are raised, or apply, 
herein. 
Statutes: 
§30-3-5, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended); 
§78B-12-112, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended); and, 
§78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
Rules: No determinative rules are raised, or apply herein. 
Statement of the Case. 
Nature of the Case: 
This is a divorce matter, in which the Decree of Divorce was signed and en-
tered, on May 23, 2002. Record at 99. Since that time, the Decree of Divorce was 
modified at trial, on April 21, 2005, the "2005 Trial", and by stipulation of the par-
ties on, or about, April 10, 2006. Record at 534 - 538, and 557, respectively. 
The current matter was commenced by Ms Davis, by way of a Petition to 
Modify, filed April 4, 2008, hereinafter referred to as, "2008 Petition". Record at 
559. Shortly after that, Ms Davis was no longer represented, and the parties filed 
various and sundry petitions and motions,pro se. 
Ms Davis sought to modify the prior orders of the Court, because of Mr. 
Davis' bankruptcy, filed in 2003. See, 2008 Petition, 3ffl 2A, and 2B, record at 559. 
See also, Transcript at p. 4, line 18, through p. 5, line 5. She raised the issues of 
additional expenses for the children for extracurricular activities, school registra-
tion, tests, and other fees; child support; use of the children as a tax exemption; 
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and, alleged damage to her credit. See, 2008 Petition, flfl 2c - 5, record at 558. See 
also, Transcript at p. 4, line 18, through p. 5, line 5. 
Course of Proceedings: 
As the parties were, for the most part, acting pro se, numerous additional pe-
titions and counter-petitions were filed right up to trial. See, Minutes Half Day 
Trial, Record at 633. See also, Record at 587 - 632. After a telephone conference, 
on January 21, 2010, the matter was set for trial. Record at 629. Transcript at p. 3, 
lines 13 - 20. 
The Trial Court held a bench trial on January 28, 2010, hereinafter referred 
to as, "2010 Trial", the Honorable David N. Mortensen presiding. Record at 633. 
Both parties appeared pro se, were sworn, and testified. Record at 632 - 633. 
The Trial Court received various exhibits. Record at 630 - 631. 
Ms Davis, in support of her claims, submitted a Credco Credit Report (Plain-
tiffs Exhibit #2), a Third District Court Complaint, with attachments (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit #7), and the front page of a tax return (Plaintiffs Exhibit #1). The Credit 
Report (Plaintiffs Exhibit #2) is contained in the attachments to the Third District 
Complaint (Plaintiffs Exhibit #7), which address marital debts that were estab-
lished in 2000, well before the divorce, Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy, or the 2005 
modification. See, Plaintiffs Exhibits 2, and 7. 
Disposition at Trial Court: 
After the Trial Court heard the testimony of the parties, and received their 
exhibits, it took the matter under advisement. Record at 632. Subsequent thereto, 
8 
Mr. Davis filed a Trial Brief, and Ms Davis filed a Response to Trial Brief. Record 
at 661, and 665, respectively. The only pertinent issue addressed in those Briefs is 
the allegation that the oldest child works, and pays for her own gasoline, and mis-
cellaneous expenses. Record at 659. 
On February 17, 2010, the Trial Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law, and Order Modifying Decree, the, "2010 Findings". Record at 679. 
On April 23, 2010, the Trial Court signed and entered, its Order on Modification of 
Divorce Decree (January 28, 2010), the, "2010 Order". Record at 725. 
The 2010 Order, in pertinent part: 
a. Raised Mr. Davis' child support, "to $1,287 per month, retroac-
tive to April 4, 2008." 2010 Order, 5 2. Record at 724. Note, no child sup-
port worksheet was located in the Record, nor is there any mention thereof, 
in any associated pleadings. 
b. Awarded Ms Davis, "the tax exemption for the minor children 
of the parties." 2010 Order, 5 3. Record at 724. 
c. Modified the prior orders such that, Mr. Davis is required to re-
imburse Ms Davis, "for one half of reasonable school expenses." 2010 Or-
der, 5 8. Record at 723. 
d. Modified the prior orders on the issue of reimbursement, stating 
that, when one party makes a claim for reimbursement, "[t]he party need not 
show that the bill has actually been paid, but need only show that the ex-
pense has been incurred." 2010 Order, J 10. Record at 723. 
Those orders were pronounced, based upon the Trial Court's 2010 Findings 
of Fact. While the actual Findings of Fact portion, of the 2010 Findings of Fact, 
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consists of eight (8) pages, four (4) of those pages are dedicated to the 2003 Bank-
ruptcy. Record at 670 - 678. Another two (2) pages of that section are devoted to 
explaining the differences between and Order to Show Cause, and a Petition to 
Modify. Record at 678-679. 
When not dealing with the Bankruptcy issue, the Trial Court found: 
a- One of the minor children turned 18. Record at 677. 
b. Mr. Davis' income has changed from $5,026 per month, to 
$6,248 per month. Record at 675. 
c. Ms Davis, who previously was not working, and had minimum 
wage imputed to her, was working, at a slightly higher rate, and her monthly 
income changed from $940, to $1,287. Id. 
d. Based thereon, Mr. Davis' monthly child support should be 
$1,287, where it had been $940. Id. Note, no child support worksheet is 
mentioned, nor located, in the Record. 
e. "[T]hat because of the financial impact the bankruptcy has had 
upon the petitioner, the petitioner should be able to claim all the tax exemp-
tions for all the children. Accordingly, the wife is awarded the tax exemp-
tion for the minor children of the parties." Record at 673. 
f. Furthermore, on the issue of the tax deduction, the Trial Court 
further found, "that the bankruptcy filed by respondent is a breach of the 
condition of the original stipulation and decree that he pay certain marital 
debts. The only remedy sought by the petitioner is that she receive the fi-
nancial benefit of the tax deduction. The court agrees this will be a just and 
fair result given that respondent has failed to perform." Record at 671. 
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g. Immediately thereafter, the Trial Court made the simple finding 
that, "where the decree provides for reimbursement... The party need not 
show that the bill has actually been paid, but need only show that it has been 
incurred.'" Record at 670. 
Statement of Relevant Facts: 
1. The parties were divorced, with the Decree of Divorce being signed 
and entered, on May 23, 2002. Record at 99. 
2. Mr. Davis' bankruptcy, the, "2003 Bankruptcy", was filed in 2003. 
Record at 530, 565 - 566. Transcript at p. 4, line 18, through p. 5, line 5, and p. 
23, lines 7 - 18. 
3. The Decree of Divorce was modified on October 26, 2005, by way of 
a trial held on April 21, 2005, hereinafter referred to as the, "2005 Trial". Record 
at 630-633. 
4. In the 2005 Trial, the Court found, among other things, that Mr. 
Davis, "received a discharge in bankruptcy in regard to the debts and obligations 
he was ordered to pay under the Decree of Divorce." 2005 Findings, $ 13. Record 
at 530. 
5. In addition to its finding that Mr. Davis had received a discharge in 
bankruptcy, the Court found that his income had been reduced from $7,000.00 per 
month, to $5,026.00 per month. 2005 Findings, 5 15. Record at 529 - 530. As to 
Ms Davis, the Court found that she was still unemployed, and imputed minimum 
wage to her. 2005 Findings, If 17. Record at 529. See also, 2010 Findings, record 
at 675. 
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6. Even with having filed his bankruptcy, the Court found Mr. Davis to 
be the primary financial contributor to the cost of raising the children. 2005 Find-
ings, 5 28. Record at 527. 
7. Having so found, the Court reduced Mr. Davis' child support obliga-
tion from $1,511.00 to $1,174.00; reduced Mr. Davis' alimony obligation from 
$1,000.00 per month to $700.00 per month; granted Mr. Davis the use of the 
youngest child, Cierra, as an exemption for tax purposes; and reinstated 55 3 and 4 
of the Decree of Divorce, which address reimbursement issues. 2005 Order, 55 7, 
9, 16, and 5 respectively. Record at 535 - 537. 
8. Both parties were represented by counsel, at that 2005 Trial. 2005 
Order. Record at 479. See also, 2005 Order, Record at 538. 
9. w The 2005 Order of the Court was again modified, by stipulation of the 
parties, on April 10, 2006. See, 2006 Order Modifying Decree of Divorce. Record 
at 557. 
10. That modification terminated Mr. Davis' alimony obligation to Ms 
Davis. Id. Record at 556. 
11. On April 4, 2008, Ms Davis, through counsel, filed a Petition to Mod-
ify the 2008 Petition, alleging that, due to Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy, the Decree 
of Divorce needed to be modified such that: 
a. Ms Davis be allowed to claim all of the minor children as de-
pendents, for tax purposes; and. 
b. Mr. Davis pay one-half (1/2) of the expenses incurred for the 
minor children for their extracurricular activities, school registration, and 
test fees. 2008 Petition, 55 2, 3, and 4. Record at 558 - 559. 
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12. The relief sought by Ms Davis was that: 
a. Ms Davis, "be allowed to claim all of the children as depend-
ants for tax purposes..." See, 2008 Petition, 5J 3. Record at 558. 
b. Mr. Davis pay, "one-half of the expenses incurred for the chil-
dren for their extracurricular activities and school registration and test fees." 
See, 2008 Petition, 5 4. Record at 558. 
c. Mr. Davis pay Ms Davis' attorney fees. See, 2008 Petition, 5 5. 
Record at 558. 
13. . That 2008 Petition did not request, nor even mention, a modification 
of Mr. Davis' ongoing child support obligation. Record at 558 - 559. See also, 
Transcript at p. 4, line 13, through p. 5, line 2. 
14. On November 9, 2009, the Trial Court held a scheduling conference, 
at which Ms Davis' counsel gave notice of his withdrawal. See, Record at 588. 
The Trial Court set the matter for a one-half (1/2) day bench trial on January 28, 
2010. Id. 
15. Ms Davis did not request a modification of child support until No-
vember 23, 2009, when she filed her Answer to Summons and Petitions the Court 
to Modify Decree of Divorce, on November 23, 2009. See, Answer to Summons 
and Petitions the Court to Modify Decree of Divorce, J 14. Record at 599. 
16. That document is the first time Ms Davis sought an adjustment of 
child support, or raised the issue of modifying Mr. Davis' child support obligation. 
Id. 
17. On February 17, 2010, the Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions at Law, and Order Modifying Decree, the, "2010 Findings of Fact". 
13 
See, Record at 666 -679. 
18. On April 23, 2010, the Trial Court signed, and entered, its Order on 
Modification of Divorce Decree (January 28, 2010), the, "2010 Order". Record at 
721 -725. 
Summary of Argument 
Point One: Standards for Modifying Prior Final Orders: 
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must 
first show that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred 'since 
the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself,' Durfee v. Durfee, 
796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Stettler v. Stet-
tler, 713 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1985)); accord Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT 
App219,5J8,983P.2d 1103." Bolliger, at 906,5 11. 
In a modification action, what a party is seeking is to change the current ap-
plicable Order, due to current changes; whether the current applicable Order is the 
original Decree of Divorce, or a subsequent Order of Modification. If a Decree of 
Divorce has been modified on some particular issue, and the parties subsequently 
seek to change the current Order on that particular issue, the Court looks at the cur-
rent Order that is in effect, the Order of Modification. As such, the moving party 
must show that the change of circumstances occurred since the entry of the last 
Order of Modification. 
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Point Two: Application of Res Judicata to Claims Concerning a Prior Bankruptcy: 
"[T]here is no question but that the principle of res judicata applies to modi-
fication proceedings, see Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah Ct.App.1990)." 
Huish v. Munro, 191 P.3d 1242, 1279, 2008 UT App 283 5 13. 
As there is complete identity of parties, and claims in this matter, any issues 
raised by Ms Davis concerning Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy were addressed, or 
capable of being raised and addressed, at the 2005 Trial. Ms Davis raised no new 
claims. See 2005 Order, Record at 534 - 538, and 2005 Findings, Record at 525 -
533. 
As such, all of Ms Davis' claims, as they relate in any way to Mr. Davis' 
2003 Bankruptcy, should have been dismissed in the instant matter. The Trial 
Court's review, and rulings based on that 2003 Bankruptcy were in error, and must 
be reversed. 
Point Three: Modification of Child Support Obligation: 
In the instant case, Mr. Davis' gross monthly income increased by only 
twenty-four percent (24%). Record at 675. The increase in child support ordered 
by the Trial Court, was only nine percent (9%). Id. If "a 25% drop in income ... 
does not satisfy the threshold requirement of section 78-45-7.2(7)(b)(iii) [currently 
§78B-12-210(9)(b)(iii), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended)] ... the changes 
presented in Father's petition do not qualify as a material substantial change, and 
they are insufficient to trigger further consideration of Father's modification peti-
tion pursuant to section 78-45-7.2(6)", Diener, 98 P.3d at 1181,5 8, then a twenty-
four percent (24%) increase does not qualify as a material substantial change. Ms 
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Davis' request for an increase in child support cannot be granted. 
Point Four: Retroactive Application of Child Support Obligation: 
Child support can only be, "modified with respect to any period during 
which a modification is pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading 
on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner..." See, §78B-12-112(4), Utah Code 
Annot. (1953, as amended). If child support is changed, then as Ms Davis did not 
request any modification of child support until November 23, 2009 (Record at 
599), the Trial Court erred in ordering the change in child support retroactive to 
April 4, 2008 (Record at 724). That Order must be reversed. 
Point Five: Requirement for Reimbursement of School Expenses: 
Absent a showing of particular special needs, or requirements on behalf of a 
child, routine school expenses are included in the child support obligation, and the 
payor of that child support is under no additional obligation to pay those fees. Such 
routine fees are part and parcel of Ms Davis child support award. See, Brooks, and 
Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d 754, 2007 UT App 291. 
The Trial Court made no findings to justify any variance from the statutory 
child support obligations, as required under §78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot. (1953, 
as amended). As such, there is no basis to award any additional child support to Ms 
Davis. Those lack of findings, along with Ms Davis' failure to show any special 
needs to substantiate additional funds, makes the Trial Court's order requiring Mr. 
Davis to reimburse those alleged costs error, which must be reversed. 
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Point Six: Requirement for Reimbursement of any Child Related Expenses With-
out Proof of Payment: 
In Utah's statutes addressing reimbursement of expenses, Utah's legislature 
has expressed a requirement that a parent who incurs medical or daycare expenses, 
"shall provide written verification of the cost and payment of those expenses to the 
other parent..." See, §78B-12-212. Medical expenses, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
amended). 
, The Decree of Divorce in this matter provided that the parent seeking reim-
bursement was required to, "provide written verification of the cost and payment of 
medical expenses..," (Decree of Divorce, J 4, Record at 96), comport with that 
statutory dictate, and provisions. Those provisions were specifically reinstated, via 
specific reference, in the 2005 Order; and, that was after the Trial Court's findings 
about, and consideration of, Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy. See, 2005 Order, 5 5. 
Record at 537. 
The Trial Court's modification of those provisions, requiring reimbursement 
without proof of payment, is contrary to statute, and the reinforced provisions of 
the Decree of Divorce. Furthermore, the Trial Court cited no specific findings to 
justify its order. 
Argument 
Point One: Standards for Modifying Prior Final Orders: 
"Trial courts in Utah have 'continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders ... based on a substantial material change in circumstances 
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.' Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) 
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(Supp.2008);(fn4) see Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, 5 11, 997 P.2d 903." 
Young v. Young, 201 P.3d 301, 304, 2009 UT App 3, fl 9. 
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must 
first show that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred 'since 
the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself.' Durfee v. Durfee, 
796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Stettler v. Stet-
tler, 713 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1985)); accord Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT 
App 219,5 8, 983 P.2d 1103." Bolliger, at 906, J 11. 
Nowhere in case law, or statute, does counsel find any specific language that 
the court must always return to the original Decree of Divorce. Most often, case 
law shows that if the issue being modified was addressed in a subsequent Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce, the court only goes back to that last final order 
which addressed the matter to be changed; it does not return to the original Decree 
of Divorce. Logically, and procedurally, this only makes sense. For in a modifica-
tion, what a party is seeking is to change the current applicable Order, due to cur-
rent changes; whether the current applicable Order is the original Decree of Di-
vorce, or a subsequent Order of Modification. If a Decree of Divorce has been 
modified on some particular issue, and the parties subsequently seek to change the 
current Order on that particular issue, the Court looks at the current Order that is in 
effect, the Order of Modification. 
The record in this matter shows that Mr. Davis' bankruptcy, and the effects 
it had on Ms Davis' financial status; care of the children; the allocation of the mi-
nor children as dependents for tax purposes; allocations of marital debt; and, which 
party actually provided the most financial support for the parties' children, were all 
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reviewed and considered fully by the Trial Court at the 2005 Trial. All were spe-
cifically addressed in the 2006 Order. 
In filing her 2008 Petition, Ms Davis simply requests a reexamination of the 
allocation of the tax exemption for the children, and reimbursement for the chil-
dren's school expenses, all based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy. Record at 
558 - 559. 
As such, Ms Davis must demonstrate a that a substantial material change of 
circumstances has occurred since the entry of that 2006 Order. This, she fails to 
do, and the Trial Court articulates no finding of fact, or conclusion at law, that any 
substantial material change of circumstances has occurred since that 2006 Order. 
The "principles of res judicata require that 'a party seeking modification of a 
divorce decree must demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has oc-
curred since the entry of the decree, and not contemplated in the decree itself.'" 
^ / / ^ , 9 P . 3 d a t l 7 8 5f2L 
Point Two: Application of Res Judicata to Claims Concerning a Prior Bankruptcy: 
[T]here is no question but that the principle of res judicata applies to 
modification proceedings, see Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). The application of the principle to such proceedings, how-
ever, is moderated by "the equitable doctrine that allows courts to reopen 
[custody] determinations [only] if the moving party can demonstrate a sub-
stantial change of circumstances." Id. "In order to meet this threshold re-
quirement, a party must show, in addition to the existence and extent of the 
change, that the change is significant in relation to the modification sought. 
The asserted change must, therefore, have some material relationship to and 
substantial effect on parenting ability or the functioning of the presently ex-
isting custodial relationship? Becker v. Becker, 694 r.zd 608, 610 (Utah 
1984) (second emphasis added). 
Huish, 191 P.3d at 1279,2008 UT App 283 5 13. 
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The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct branches: claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion. See Swainston v. Intermountain Health 
Care, 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988). Claim preclusion involves the same 
parties or their privies and also the same cause of action, " 'and this pre-
cludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as 
those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action.1 " Schaer v. State, 657 
P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983) (quoting Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 
690 (Utah 1978)). 
Macris, 16P.3dat 1219, J 19. 
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action, a 
plaintiff must satisfy three requirements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Sec-
ond, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the 
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first 
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988) (citing Penrod, 669 
P.2d at 875; Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1981); Int'l 
Res. v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515, 516-17 (Utah 1979); Krofcheck v. Downey 
State Bank, 580 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah 1978); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 
P.2d 379, 380 (Utah 1974); Natl Fin. Co. v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 265-66, 
382 P.2d 405, 407 (1963); Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45,47, 376 P.2d 
946, 947-48 (1962)). All three elements must be present for claim preclusion 
to apply. See Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247. 
Macris, 66 P.3d at 1219,5 20. 
Applying the Marc is claim preclusion requirements to the instant case, one 
finds all three requirements are met. Specifically: 
1. The same parties: Both parties were present, and testified at the 
2005 Trial, and both parties testified at the 2010 Trial. The only difference 
between the two (2) trials, is that both parties were represented by counsel 
throughout the 2002 Petition, and 2005 Trial, while on the 2008 Petition, and 
the 2010 Trial, both parties were, for the most part, pro se. The parties have 
been identical throughout this matter. There can be no argument that the 
first Marcis requirement was not met. 
2. Barred claims: All of Ms Davis' claims, which relate to Mr. 
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Davis' bankruptcy, either were raised during the 2005 Trial, or could have 
been raised at the time of that trial. 
a. All of the claims Ms Davis raised in her 2008 Petition, 
were based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy. Those claims were ei-
ther specifically addressed at the 2005 Trial, or could, and should have 
been raised in that matter, at that time; and, she was represented by 
counsel in that matter. 
b. At the 2005 Trial, the Trial Court found Mr. Davis, "re-
ceived a discharge in bankruptcy in regard to the debts and obligations 
he was ordered to pay under the Decree of Divorce." 2005 Findings 
of Fact, 5 13. Record at 530. Even with having filed his bankruptcy, 
the Trial Court found that Mr. Davis was the primary financial con-
tributor to the cost of raising the children. 2005 Findings of Fact, 5 28. 
Record at 527. Based thereon, the Trial Court reduced Mr. Davis' 
child support obligation from $1,511.00 to $1,174.00; reduced Mr. 
Davis' alimony obligation from $1,000.00 per month to $700.00 per 
month; and, granted Mr. Davis the use of the youngest child, Cierra, as 
an exemption for tax purposes. 2005 Order Modifying Decree, $$ 7, 9, 
and 16, respectively. Record at 535 - 536. 
3. The 2002 Petition was resolved by the 2005 Trial. The 2006 
Order Modifying Decree, which was a final judgment on the merits, was the 
result of that 2005 Trial. 
The Marc is test was, and is, met. The doctrine of claim preclusion applies to 
all of Ms Davis' claims based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy. The Trial Court 
21 
erred in allowing any testimony on those issues, and in considering any evidence re-
lated to those claims. All Ms Davis' claims, based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 bank-
ruptcy should have been dismissed, as Mr. Davis suggested. Transcript at p. 24, 
lines 4 - 9 . See also, Record at 562 - 566. 
Point Three: Modification of Child Support Obligation: 
Utah's legislature has pronounced factors which it deems bear on the issue 
of modifying child support. See, §78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
amended). 
In the instant case, Mr. Davis' child support obligation was last adjusted in 
the 2005 Order. Record at 536. See also, 2010 Findings, record at 675. As such, 
there has not been any adjustment for more than three (3) years, indicating that 
§78B-12-210(8), Utah Code Annot (1953), is applicable. That section states: 
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within 
the previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may 
move the court to adjust the amount of a child support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a motion under Subsection (8)(a), the court 
shall, taking into account the best interests of the child: 
(i) determine whether there is a difference between the payor's or-
dered support amount and the payor's support amount that would be 
required under the guidelines; and 
(ii) if there is a difference as described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), ad-just the payor's ordered support amount to the payor's support amount 
provided in the guidelines ii: 
(A) the difference is 10% or more; 
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature; and 
(C) the order adjusting the payor's ordered support amount does 
not deviate from the guidelines. 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not nec-
essary for an adjustment under this Subsection (8). 
In the instant case, Mr. Davis' gross monthly income increased by only 
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twenty-four percent (24%). Record at 675. The increase in child support ordered 
by the Trial Court, was only nine percent (9%). Id. 
Diener appears to be the controlling case on this issue. Diener does not di-
rectly address §78B-12-210(8), Utah Code Annot (1953), it does discuss its prede-
cessor §78-45-7.2, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), in detail. 
Diener involves a modification of child support where the father's income 
had decreased twenty-five percent (25%). Diener, 98 P.3d at 1181, J 8. If failing 
to meet the statutory thirty percent (30%) level, the father appealed the trial court's 
denial of his claim. Id. 
In its discussion, the Diener court fully reviewed §78-45-7.2(6)(b) Utah 
Code Annot. (1953, as amended), now enumerated as §78B-12-210(8), Utah Code 
Annot (1953). Diener, at 1181 - 1183, 55 9 - 14. This court held that the trial 
court, "must determine whether the petitioner's current obligation, as set by a pre-
existing court order, is within ten percent (10%) of the presumptive figure arrived 
at through the modification petition. If there is a variance greater than 10%, the 
statute directs that 'the court shall adjust the amount to that which is provided for 
in the guidelines.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6)(b)." Diener, 98 P.3d at 1182, % 
11 (emphasis in original). 
The trial court in Diener, also failed to make any detailed findings on the is-
sues, and failed to calculate and apply the statutory guidelines to the parties' jfi-
come. Diener, 98 P.3d at 1183,5 14. Furthermore, there was no evidence, or find-
ings, to justify any deviation from statute. Diener, 98 P.3d at 1183,5 13. 
Those failures of the Diener trial court read as identical to the 2010 Findings 
of the Trial Court in this matter. The Trial Court made no calculations. No child 
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support worksheet is located in the record. And, other than a cursory reference to 
the monthly incomes of Mr. and Mrs. Davis, no single finding, nor piece of ra-
tional is given for the Trial Court's failure to abide by statute, or to justify varying 
from statute. 
As noted in Diener, simple arithmetic shows that the changes in income, and 
in the child support amount, fail to meet the statutory requirements in the instant 
case. See, Diener, 98 P.3d at 1181, 5 8. The Trial Court erred in modifying child 
support, and that error needs to be reversed. 
Point Four: Retroactive Application of Child Support Obligation: 
The Trial Court has continuing jurisdiction to make changes to a party's on-
going child support obligation. See, §30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annot (1953, as 
amended). But, child support can only be, "modified with respect to any period 
during which a modification is pending, but only from the date of service of the 
pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner..." See, §78B-12-112(4), 
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). And, should the Trial Court determine that 
a modification is in order, "the tribunal shall order a judgment to be entered for any 
difference in the original order and the modified amount for the period from the 
service of the pleading until the final order of modification is entered." Id. 
That limitation has been supported by Utah case law, as well. The Trial 
Court cannot retroactively apply an order of child support further back in time than 
the date of the service of a pleading seeking modification of child support. See, 
Brooks, 881 P.2d at 960, Wilde, 35 P.3d at 345 - 346, 2001 UT App at J 20, and 
Wall, 157 P.3d at 345,2007 UT App 61 at 5 19. 
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In the instant case, Ms Davis did not request, or even mention, a modifica-
tion of Mr. Davis's child support obligation. April 4, 2008, was the date Ms 
Davis' counsel filed the 2008 Petition. Record at 559. As noted, Ms Davis never 
raised a claim to modify child support in that 2008 Petition. Record at 558 - 559. 
All she sought, was that she be allowed to claim all of the minor children as de-
pendents, for tax purposes; and, Mr. Davis pay one-half (1/2) of the expenses in-
curred for the minor children for their extracurricular activities, school registration, 
and test fees. 2008 Petition, 55 3, and 4. Record at 558 - 559. 
It was not until much later, that Ms Davis raised the issue of changing child 
support. That filing, Ms Davis' Answer to Summons and Petitions the Court to 
Modify Decree of Divorce {see, Answer to Summons and Petitions the Court to 
Modify Decree of Divorce, 5 14), occurred on November 23, 2009. See, 2010 
Findings of Fact, p. 2, 5 3, Record at 678, wherein the Trial Court specifically 
noted the filing of that pleading. That was over a year and one-half after her filing 
of the 2008 Petition. 
Yet, the Trial Court concluded that Mr. Davis' child support obligation 
should be increased, "retroactive to April 4, 2008, the date the petition to modify 
was filed." See, 2010 Findings of Fact p. 11,5 4. Record at 669. Mr. Davis'child 
support obligation was increased, retroactive to April 4, 2008, based on that con-
clusion. 
The Trial Court's order that the child support obligation was to be retroac-
tive to April 2, 2008, was contrary to statute, and case law. It was, and is, reversi-
ble error. The very earliest date that any notice of Ms Davis' request to change 
child support was given to Mr. Davis, was November 23, 2009. The Trial Court 
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erred in ordering the application of the change in child support any earlier than 
November 23, 2009. 
Point Five: Requirement for Reimbursement of School Expenses: 
Ms Davis asked for an order that Mr. Davis pay one-half (1/2) of the expenses 
incurred for the minor children for their extracurricular activities, school registration, 
and test fees. 2008 Petition, 5 4. Record at 558. 
The Trial Court found that, "issues of school expenses have arisen that did 
not exist when the decree was entered." 2010, Findings, Record at 677. That is the 
only finding the Trial Court made on this issue. Nowhere did it specify what those 
school expenses were, nor that those expenses represented a material change in cir-
cumstances not contemplated in the Decree of Divorce, or subsequent Orders Modi-
fying the Decree of Divorce. Without any such findings to support its conclusion, 
the Trial Court simply ordered that Mr. Davis is to reimburse Ms Davis for one-half 
(1/2) of reasonable school expenses. 2010 Order, p. 12, 5 8. The Trial Court did 
not even limit those expenses to school expenses for the children. As written, one 
could even interpret the 2010 Order to require Mr. Davis to reimburse Ms Davis for 
any school expenses Ms Davis may incur. 
On this particular issue, counsel for Mr. Davis has found only Brooks. In 
Brooks, it appears that both parents had agreed upon the desire that their children 
attend a private school. 
Brooks contains a thorough analysis of Utah's statutory guidelines, and the 
burden required to rebut their application. Having completed that analysis, the 
Court of Appeals, having found no authority to the contrary, stated its belief that 
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private school costs are part and parcel of the child support award. Brooks, 881 
P.2dat959,fn 4. 
Brooks involved private school costs, with specific findings of the costs, and 
history of prior private schooling of the child involved. Brooks, 881 P.2d at 957 -
959. The Court of Appeals reviewed that case, and found that the only way to re-
quire child support, outside of the statutory guidelines establishing child support, was 
to show sufficient cause to deviate from the statutory guidelines in a modification 
case. Id. 
In the instant case, Ms Davis made no showing that the school expenses were 
for private school, as agreed to by Mr. Davis. Nor did she show any evidence of 
any extraordinary expense, or need on the part of the children. All that she showed 
were the same expenses that any parent, of any child attending any public school 
might face. Nor did she make any showing, or attempt to show, with any specific-
ity, what those expenses were, nor did her exhibits show any special expenses. In 
like manner, the Trial Court made no findings whatsoever as to what expenses ex-
isted, nor that the expenses were of any extraordinary nature. 
"A trial court's 'findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or de-
cree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should 
be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.' Rasband v. Ras-
band, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 131 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A trial court's 
failure to provide adequate findings is reversible error when the facts are not clear 
from the record." Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d at 759, 2007 UT App at J 17. 
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Brooks states that that school costs are part and parcel of the child support 
award, and that to deviate from the statutory guidelines when setting a child support 
award, requires specific findings to substantiate such deviation. Andrus sets forth 
the burden for those findings, and the required logical connection to the evidence. It 
also states that a failure to provide such findings is reversible error. 
Applying Brooks and Andrus to the instant case, leads to the conclusion that 
Ms Davis showed no basis to vary from the principle that school costs are covered 
by child support, and that the Trial Court, having made no specific findings to the 
contrary, erred in requiring Mr. Davis to reimburse those expenses. That ruling is 
in error, and needs to be reversed. 
Point Six: Requirement for Reimbursement of any Child Related Expenses Without 
Proof of Payment: 
The Trial Court made the determination that, "[w]here Decree provides for 
reimbursement, any party claiming reimbursement must submit evidence of incur-
ring bills... The party need not show that the bill has actually been paid, but need 
only show that the expense has been incurred." 2010 Findings, p. 12 5 9; 2010 Or-
der, J10. 
Yet, under Utah's statutes addressing reimbursement of expenses, Utah's 
legislature has required that a parent who incurs medical or daycare expenses shall 
provide written verification of the cost and payment of those expenses to the other 
parent..." See, §78B-12-212. Medical expenses, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
amended). 
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The.Decree of Divorce's provisions, which provided that the parent seeking 
reimbursement was required to, "provide written verification of the cost and pay-
ment of medical expenses..." (Decree of Divorce, J 4, Record at 96), comport with 
that statutory dictate, and provisions. The Decree of Divorce provisions were spe-
cifically restated, via specific reference, in the 2005 Order. See, 2005 Order, 5 5. 
Record at 537. And, that was after the Trial Court's findings about, and consid-
eration of, Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy. 
So, having been considered in the 2005 Trial, specifically in light of Mr. 
Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy, the Trial Court in the instant matter changed that provi-
sion, removing the proof of payment requirement. Record at 670. See also, 2010 
Order, 5 10, record at 723. 
The Trial Court shows no specific finding upon which it bases that change. 
The transcript reveals no evidence, nor argument for that change, other than ex-
changes about outstanding claims for reimbursement made by each party. 
However, that finding is made immediately following the Trial Court's brief 
four (4) page dissertation on how Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy breached the condi-
tions of the original (as in the 2002 Decree of Divorce) stipulation and Decree, and 
that Ms Davis was due some sort of readjustment of that original contract. See, 
2010 Findings, record at 669 - 672. 
Having set forth no specific findings as to any change in circumstances since 
these provisions were restated in the 2005 Order, the Trial Court had no basis to 
modify those provisions. Particularly as the Trial Court had already considered the 
effect of Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy when it made its 2005 Order. There is no 
finding in the 2010 Findings, specifically stating any reason to vary from statute. 
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No material change in circumstances; there is no basis for reviewing, let 
alone changing those provisions. The Trial Court's ruling is in error, and must be 
reversed. The party seeking reimbursement of a covered expense must show writ-
ten verification of the cost and payment of the claimed expense. 
Conclusion 
The Trial Court erred in modifying the prior Orders. The Trial Court erred 
in reconsidering the situation of the parties, in light of Mr. Davis' 2003 Bank-
ruptcy, as that 2003 Bankruptcy had already been addressed in the 2005 Order. As 
such, the doctrine of res judicata, specifically the doctrine of claim preclusion, ap-
plied. None of Ms Davis' claims which touched upon, or concerned Mr. Davis' 
2003 Bankruptcy should have been heard, or allowed. 
The Trial Court modified the award of the use of the minor children as ex-
emptions for tax purposes, based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy. As that issue 
had been fully litigated in the 2005 Trial, it was error for the Trial Court to 
readdress those issues, and to make any changes to the 2005 Order, on that issue. 
The Trial Court also erred in modifying Mr. Davis' child support, as there 
had not been the statutorily required change in the child support amount; in making 
any such change retroactive to the date of the original petition (April 2008), rather 
than when Ms Davis made the request (November, 2009), in violation of statute; 
and, in modifying the prior Orders to state that any reimbursement claims did not 
require proof of payment, again in violation of statute. Furthermore, the Trial 
Court demonstrated no basis, nor rationale, for varying from those statutes. 
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All of those errors involved matters of law, statutory interpretation, or some 
combination of the two. All those errors should be reversed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 2010. 
DAVID R. HARTWIG, ESQ. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Addendum 
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Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
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30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children -
Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time -
Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to 
the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in 
eveiy decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and 
dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-
pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles; 
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, 
hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-
5.4 which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, 
hospital, or dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or 
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's 
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery 
Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial 
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent 
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines 
that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared 
for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent 
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution 
of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother 
and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and 
other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may 
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered 
under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without 
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. (7) If a petition alleges noncompliance 
with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the 
immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, 
the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs 
incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-
ordered visitation or parent-time. (8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the 
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v) whether the recipient spouse has custody 
of minor children requiring support; (vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business 
owned or operated by the payor spouse; and (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly 
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the 
payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage, (b) The court 
may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. (c) As a general rule, the court 
should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in 
accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable 
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time 
of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage, (d) 
The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards 
of living, (e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in 
the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and 
awarding alimony. (f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and 
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage, (g) (i) The court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce, (ii) The court may not 
modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist 
at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that 
action, (iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not 
be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's 
improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage 
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party 
pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that 
former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of 
alimony sh&il resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another 
person. 
Amended by Chapter 285,2010 General Session 
Utah Statutes 
Title 78A. Judiciary and Judicial Administration 
Chapter 4. Court of Appeals 
Current through 2010 Legislative Session 
§ 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs 
and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory ap-
peals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, 
except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the ex-
ecutive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the 
state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agen-
cies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602 ; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or 
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcer-
ated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a convic-
tion of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals.from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, 
and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court 
may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter 
over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History. Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session 
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Utah Statutes 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act 
Current through 2009 Legislative Session 
§ 78B-12-112.Payment under child support order - Judgment. 
(1) All monthly payments of child support shall be due on the 1st day of each month pursuant to 
Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 3,Child Support Services Act, Part 4, Income Withholding in IV-
DCases, and Part 5, Income Withholding inNon-IV-D Cases. 
(2) For purposes of child support services and incomewithholding pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 
11, Part 3 and Part 4,child support is not considered past due until the 1st day of thefollowing 
month. For purposes other than those specified inSubsection (1) support shall be payable 1/2 by 
the 5th day of eachmonth and 1/2 by the 20th day of that month, unless the order ordecree pro-
vides for a different time for payment. 
(3) Each payment or installment of child or spousal supportunder any support order, as defined 
by Section 78B-12-102, is, on and after the date it isdue: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of anyjudgment of a district court, except as 
provided in Subsection(4); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in thisand in any other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any otherjurisdiction, except as provided in 
Subsection (4), 
(4) A child or spousal support payment under a support order maybe modified with respect to 
any period during which a modificationis pending, but only from the date of service of the plead-
ing onthe obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or on the obligor,if the obligee is the petitioner. 
If the tribunal orders that thesupport should be modified, the effective date of the modification-
shall be the month following service on the parent whose support isaffected. Once the tribunal 
determines that a modification isappropriate, the tribunal shall order a judgment to be entered 
forany difference in the original order and the modified amount forthe period from the service of 
the pleading until the final orderof modification is entered. 
(5) The judgment provided for in Subsection (3)(a), to beeffective and enforceable as a lien 
against the real property interest of any third party relying on the public record, shall bedocketed 
in the district court in accordance with Sections 78B-5-202 and 62A-11-312.5. 
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Utah Statutes 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act 
Current through 2009 Legislative Session 
§ 78B-12-214.Child care expenses - Expenses not incurred. 
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent shareequally the reasonable 
work-related child care expenses of theparents. 
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, aparent shall begin paying his share 
on a monthly basis immediatelyupon presentation of proof of the child care expense, but 
if thechild care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspendmaking monthly 
payment of that expense while it is not beingincurred, without obtaining a modification of 
the child supportorder. 
(b) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, aparent who incurs child care 
expense shall provide writtenverification of the cost and identity of a child care provider 
tothe other parent upon initial engagement of a provider andthereafter on the request of 
the other parent. 
(ii) In tlie absence of a court order to the contrary, the parentshall notify the other parent 
of any change of child care provideror the monthly expense of child care within 30 
calendar days of thedate of the change. 
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, aparent incurring child care 
expenses may be denied the right toreceive credit for the expenses or to recover the 
otherparent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring theexpenses fails to comply 
with Subsection (2)(b). 
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
78B-12-217 
Title 78B - Judicial Code 
Chapter 12 - Utah Child Support Act 
78B-12-217. Award of tax exemption for dependent children. 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to claim a 
child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax purposes. Unless the 
parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or administrative agency shall award in 
any final order the exemption on a case-by-case basis. 
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall consider: 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising 
the child; and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may not award 
any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not current in his child support 
obligation, in which case the c ourt or administrative agency may award an exemption to 
the custodial parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will result in a tax 
benefit to that parent. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Reproduction of parts of the record of central importance. 
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7110 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801)943-8107 
Fax: (801) 943-4744 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
COREY G. DAVIS, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 024400391 
Commissioner Thomas Patten 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the Honorable Thomas Patten of the 
above-entitled Court on the V f day of April, 2002, the parties having entered into a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and the same having been filed with the Court and 
the Respondent having consented that his default could be heard and said default being entered and 
evidence having been received in regard to jurisdiction and grounds based upon the AjQfidavit of 
Petitioner and the Court having reviewed the records and files herein and being fully advised in the 
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premises; the Court having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
L The Petitioner be and is hereby is awarded a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds 
of matrimony between the parties herein. 
2. That the Petitioner be and is hereby awarded the sole care, custody and control of 
the minor children with the Respondent being awarded reasonable rights of visitation pursuant to 
Utah Code 30-3-35. Further, it is reasonable that the parties be bound by the advisory guidelines 
contained in Utah Code 30-3-33, 36, and 37. A copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
3. That the Respondent be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $ 1,511 per month 
as more specifically stated in the child support worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and 
incorporated herein by reference. Said child support shall be paid on the first of each month 
beginning April 1, 2002, and continuing until the minor children reach the age of eighteen (18) or 
their normal class graduates from high school, whichever occurs last. Income withholding relief 
consistent with Utah Code Annotated §62a-11 -502, is hereby waived for the reason that the parties 
have established an alternate mechanism whereby Respondent is paid the child support due and owing 
herein. 
Consistent with Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.10, when a child graduates from high school 
and the obligation for the support of that child ends, the base child support award shall automatically 
be adjusted to reflect the lower base combined support obligation shown in the statutory table for the 
remaining number of children. 
2 
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The parties are advised consistent with Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.2(8) that if this child 
support order has not been modified within the previous three years, a parent, legal guardian or the 
Office of Recovery Services may petition the Court to adjust the child support order. The Court shall 
adjust the support amount if it receives evidence of a non-temporary change often (10%) percent or 
more as then calculated under the guidelines. Further, a parent, legal guardian or the Office of 
Recovery Services may petition the Court to adjust the amount of the child support order at any time 
if there has been a substantial change in circumstances since entry of the last child support order. 
Also as an additional form of support, each party shall pay one-half (Vi) of all work-related 
or vocational-training-related, out-of-pocket child care expenses incurred for the benefit of the 
parties' minor children- The parties shall pay their share on a monthly basis immediately upon 
presentation of proof of the child care expenses from the other party, but may suspend paying the 
monthly expense while it is not being incurred. The parent who incurred child care expenses should 
provide written verification of the costs and identity of the child care provider to the other parent on 
engagement of a provider, and thereafter upon the request of the other parent. 
4, Respondent is ordered to obtain and maintain insurance for the minor children. Each 
party shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a party for the 
children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the premium shall be deemed the per capita 
share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by 
dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the 
result by the number of children in the instant case. 
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Each party is ordered to share equally in all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical 
expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent children and actually 
paid by the parties. The parties shall cooperate by exchanging all claim forms and statements received 
by insurance companies in order to coordinate the payment of all such expenses. 
Consistent with UCA §78-45-7.13, each party who carries such insurance shall provide 
verification of coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of 
the Social Security Act, 42 USC 601, et seq. upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and 
thereafter on or before January 2nd of each calendar year. 
Each party who incurs medical expenses for the children shall provide written verification of 
the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other within thirty days of payment. Any party who 
fails to comply with the above notice provisions) may be denied the right to receive credit for an 
expense or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses. If either party chooses to use a 
provider, hospital, or care giver outside of the insurance plan, then that party will be responsible for 
all of said expenses for the same. 
5. The Respondent is ordered to maintain life insurance on his life in the sum of at least 
$ 150,000.00 naming the Petitioner and the minor children as beneficiaries thereon until such time that 
alimony and child support terminates. Respondent shall provide Petitioner a written verification of 
said life insurance policy on an annual basis. 
6. That the Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner alimony in the sum of $1,000 
per month beginning with the first month after the home and residence of the parties is sold. Said 
alimony shall terminate upon the remarriage, 
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cohabitation or death of the Petitioner or nine (9) years from the date of the Decree of Divorce, 
whichever occurs first. 
Further each party is ordered to exchange their financial information each year by April 30, 
including W-2s, tax returns, and recent pay stubs. 
Respondent shall pay the child support on the first of each month to Petitioner by making a 
direct deposit of said amounts into an account identified by Petitioner. 
7. The Petitioner be and is hereby awarded all of the net equity received from the sale 
of said home and residence. 
8. The parties are hereby awarded as her or his sole and separate property, all items of 
personal property as they have heretofore tentatively divided it and is in their possession except for 
a few items as. agreed upon between the parties that should be also awarded to the Respondent. 
9. That the Respondent be ordered to assume and pay the marital debts and obligations 
to MBNA, First USA and First National, together with the loan at Bank One in regard to his truck. 
It is reasonable that the Petitioner pay the debts and obligations at Sears, Retailers National and Farm 
Bueau, and the debt and obligation on her car at Wells Fargo Bank. It is reasonable that each party 
indemnify and hold the other party harmless therefrom and further that each party assume and pay 
any and all other debts incurred by that party in their own name that are not stated herein. 
Further, the Respondent Corey Davis is ordered to assume and pay the first and second 
mortgages on the home and residence of the parties until the same is sold. In consideration thereof, 
the Respondent shall not have to pay alimony until the first month after the home and residence is 
sold. Also, the monthly child support obligation of $ 1,511 shall be reduced to $ 1,400 per month until 
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said home and residence is sold. However, the first month immediately following the month that the 
home and residence is sold, the Respondent shall pay $ 1,511 in child support and $ 1,000 in alimony. 
Further, the Respondent agrees to co-sign on a loan for the Petitioner to purchase a new home 
after the home and residence of the parties is sold as long as he has the financial means to do the 
same. 
10. That any and all assets not disclosed by either party or stated herein are ordered to 
be equally divided between the parties. 
11. Petitioner be and is hereby entitled to claim the minor child Cierra as a dependent for 
tax purposes and the Respondent is entitled to claim the minor child Kayla as a dependent for tax 
purposes. Further, in regard to the third child Shian, the Petitioner is awarded said child as an 
exemption for even number years starting with the year 2002 and the Respondent is awarded said 
child as a dependent for tax purposes in odd years. 
12. Both parties be and hereby are restrained from using illegal drugs or abusing alcohol 
when either have custody or visitation with the minor children. Further, both parties shall be 
restrained from saying any derogatory, demeaning, or disparaging remarks about the other party in 
the presence of the minor children or allowing the minor children to be present when any third parties 
are making any derogatory, demeaning, or disparaging remarks about the other party. 
13. Each be and hereby is awarded one-half of any and all retirement accounts and 
benefits asd/or annuities acquired by either party and accrued during the marriage. 
14. Respondent is ordered to pay $2,000 toward Petitioner's attorneys fees and each 
party shall pay their own attorneys fees and costs except as stated herein. 
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15. The Respondent hereby acknowledges that the Petitioner had his consent to withdraw 
monies from the joint bank account that the Respondent held with himself and his mother and also 
his own personal account 
16. Each party be and is hereby ordered to sign and execute any and all documents or 
instruments necessary to eflfectuate the transfer of legal interest in and to the marital assets as stated 
herein in accordance with this stipulation and property settlement agreement. 
DATED this J 2 ? day of ^r i l , #)02. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
tf H4 R££> 
W 
Matthew P. Jtide, Attorney for Respondent 
<p*^ *ftr?3p 
Darold J. MeDade, Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce via the United 
States mail, postage prepaid; on the J~t day of April, 2002, to the following attorney Jbr 
Respondent: 
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I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY O f 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH' 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Matthew P. Jube 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, UT 84663 
Darold J. McDade 
Assistant Attorney General 
150 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo,UT 84606 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MODIFICATION OF 
DIVORCE DECREE was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the \ 2 day of April, 2010 to: 
David Hartwig 
1817 South Main Street #17 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attorney for Respondent 
An employee qflChristensen THoi 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Lisa Davis, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Corey G. Davis, 
Respondent 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Case No.: 024400391 
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
The above matter was heard before the Honorable James R. Taylor of the Fourth District 
Court on April 21,2005. Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Richard S. 
Nemelka. The Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, D. Bruce Oliver. 
Witnesses were sworn and testified and exhibits were admitted. At the close of Respondent's 
presentation of evidence regarding a change in circumstances since the original decree, the 
Petitioner made a Motion to Dismiss Respondent's request for a change of custody. The Court 
heard argument and finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on or about May 23,2002, where the 
Petitioner was awarded the sole care, custody and control of the parties, minor children and the 
Respondent was ordered to pay child support in the sum of $1511.00 per month and alimony in 
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the sum of $1,000.00 per month together with other obligations as stated therein. 
2. Respondent filed a Petition for Modification in October of 2002 and Petitioner filed an 
Answer and Counter-Petition in November of 2002. 
3. Various hearings were held on Petitioner's Orders to Show Cause and Respondent's 
Motion on Januaiy 6, 2003, April 24,2003, December 16,2003 and August 3,2004, and Orders 
were entered in regard to those hearings. Respondent filed Objections to some of the 
recommendations of the Commissioner in regard to those hearings and the Court agreed to hear 
Objections at the above-mentioned trial. 
4. The Petitioner, Lisa Davis, had problems with the use of illegal drugs and alcohol 
prior to the divorce which was known to the Respondent. Based upon that, the parties stipulated 
in the Decree of Divorce, paragraph 12, that both parties would be restrained from using illegal 
drugs or abusing alcohol when either party had custody or visitation with the minor children. 
Respondent'testified that he stipulated to Petitioner being awarded the sole custody of the minor 
children at the time of the Decree of Divorce based upon his belief that the Petitioner would 
discontinue her use of the illegal drugs. 
5. In approximately July of 2003, Petitioner pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor for 
driving under the influence with the minor children present in the vehicle. Further, Petitioner 
later violated her probation by testing positive for illegal substances. 
6. Petitioner was ordered in her criminal action to undergo monthly urinalysis tests 
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which she had done from July of 2004 through April of 2005. None of the tests indicated use of 
a controlled substance. Petitioner did miss one test in March of 2005 because of car problems. 
7. The Court found that there had not been a significant and material change in 
circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Court further found that although 
the Respondents trust in the Petitioner has changed and that he does not believe she will 
continue to refrain from using illegal drugs this change in Respondent's trust does not constitute 
a significant change of circumstances justifying a change of custody. 
8. The Court granted Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's claim for a change of 
custody. The Petitioner shall continue to have the care, custody, and control of the minor 
children and all provisions of the Decree of Divorce relating to custody shall remain in full force 
and effect 
9. Based upon the parties1 Stipulation as well as the Court's finding that it is in the best 
interest of the children to modify the parenting time schedule, the Respondent and the Petitioner 
shall be bound by the relocation statute, Utah Code § 30-3-37 and § 78-45-7.11. 
10. It is reasonable that both parties exchange their current addresses and phone numbers 
and in the event of a change in either their address or phone number they shall forthwith notify 
the other party. Further, when the Respondent has the minor children for parenting time he shall 
provide to the Petitioner a contact person and phone number. 
11. Although there was a dispute between the parties as to whether or not the Petitioner 
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has received the health insurance card from the Respondent or verification of his life insurance, it 
is reasonable that the Respondent provide to the Petitioner an insurance card for the minor 
children's health insurance and a description of the benefits as well as a copy of his life insurance 
policy or verification of the same as required by the Decree of Divorce. The Respondent shall 
provide the Petitioner with an insurance card and the verification of the life insurance policy by 
immediately mailing those documents by certified mail with a return receipt. 
12. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Decree of Divorce will continue to govern the payment of 
medical insurance premiums, non-covered medical expenses and day care expenses. 
13. The Court finds that the Respondent failed to pay the full amount of his child support 
and alimony obligations evidenced by the Office of Recovery Services child support and alimony 
payment histories admitted by the Court as Exhibits 1 and 2. The Respondent also received a 
discharge in bankruptcy in regard to the debts and obligations he was order to pay under the 
Decree of Divorce. 
14. The Respondent admitted that he knew of the Orders of the Court in regard to his 
obligation and the Court further finds that he had the ability to pay the child support and alimony 
obligations prior to October of 2003. 
15. At the time of the Decree of Divorce in May of 2002 the Respondent's gross monthly 
income was $7,000.00 per month and the Petitioner's gross monthly income was zero. The 
Respondent testified that in October of 2002, he lost the employment that he had at the time of 
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ftfe-Decree of Divorce. However, his gross income for the year 2002 was $95 ,^000.00. No 
credible evidence was provided by the Respondent in regard to the amount of income he received 
from October 2002 until October of 2003. However, in October of 2003 he obtained his current 
employment earning $29.00 per hour for a 40-hour week which equals $5,026.00 per month. 
16. The Court finds that Respondent's income as of October 2003 has been reduced 
approximately 29% and, based thereon, a significant and material change of circumstances has 
occurred in regard to his income justifying the Court reviewing the child support and alimony 
obligations. 
17. The Petitioner is still unemployed; however, the Court finds that the Petitioner could 
work ftdl-time and imputes income to her at minimum wage of $940.00 per month, 
18. It is reasonable that the child support obligation be reduced to the sum of $1,174.00 
beginning in October of 2003 and that the Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child support in 
the sum of $1,174.00 effective October 2003 and continuing thereafter pursuant to the terms of 
the Decree of Divorce. 
19. The Court finds that the Respondent's income beginning October 2003 has been 
reduced approximately 30% than at the time of the Original Decree and therefore reduces his 
Alimony obligation by 30%. It is reasonable that the alimony payment of $1,000.00 per month 
be reduced to $700.00 per month effective October of 2003 and that those alimony payments 
shall continue until terminated as stated in paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce. 
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20. It is reasonable that income withholding relief consistent with Utah Code § 62(a)-11-
502 and other applicable statutes be forthwith put into effect to enable the Office of Recovery 
Services to continue to collect from the Respondent the child support and alimony obligations. 
21. The Court will not change the previous judgment for arrearages in child support and 
alimony written in the Orders signed on April 8,2003 and June 26,2003 which encompass the 
time periods beginning October 2002 through April 2003. The Court admitted the Office of 
Recovery Services' child support and alimony payment histories as Exhibits 1 and 2. Based on 
these exhibits, the total still outstanding for these judgments is $2,872.40 in principal and $8.16 
in accrued interest as of April 2005 for alimony and $1280.91 in principal and $3.64 in accrued 
interest as of April 2005. for child support. Statutory interest will continue to accrue on these 
amounts. The Office of Recovery Services may continue to execute upon these existing 
judgments. 
22. Based on Exhibits 1 and 2, the total amount of child support owed by the Respondent 
for the time period beginning May 2003 through April 12,2005 is $10,120.25 with interest 
accruing at the statutory rate. 
23. Based on the Office of Recovery Services Alimony Payment Histories, the total 
amount of alimony owed by the Respondent for the time period beginning May 2003 through 
April 12,2005 is $7,025.91 with interest accruing at the statutory rate. 
25. The Court does not find the Respondent in further contempt because Respondent had 
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made substantial payments toward child support and alimony. Previous contempt sanctions will 
be held in abeyance so long as the Respondent pays $100.00 per month to Petitioner toward the 
arrearage judgments for child support and alimony. 
26. It is reasonable that the previous judgments against Respondent for Petitioner's 
attorney fees, written in the Orders on April 8,2003, June 26,2003 and December 16,2003, 
which totaled $4,000, with interest accruing, remain the same. 
27. Neither party shall be awarded attorneys fees in regard to the Petition and Counter-
Petition to Modify and the trial in this matter. 
28. The Court received evidence showing that Respondent is the primary financial 
contributor to the cost of raising the children. The Court using its equitable powers under the 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.21 finds that paragraph 11 of the parties, Decree of Divorce 
regarding who is entitled to claim which children as dependants for tax purposes should be 
modified. The original decree entitles Petitioner to claim the youngest child, Cierra, as an 
exemption, while entitling Respondent to claim the middle child, Kayla, as an exemption. This 
Court finds that the Decree should be modified to entitle Respondent to claim the yoxmgest child, 
Cierra as an exemption, while entitling the Petitioner to claim the middle child Kayla as an 
exemption. The provision alternating the use of the oldest child, Shian, as an exemption is not 
modified. This Court further orders that if one party is unable to make any benefit from any 
exemption(s), then the other party is entitled to full use of the exemption(s). 
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29. That all other provisions of the Decree of Divorce shall remain in full force and 
effect. 
Conclusions of Law 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters its Conclusions of Law: 
1. Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's claim for a change of custody shall be 
granted and the custody of the minor children shall remain with the Petitioner as stated in the 
Decree of Divorce. 
2. That the Decree of Divorce shall be amended and modified pursuant to the Findings of 
Fact as stated above. 
Dated this / f T day of &c&- , 2J 
Judge James R. Taylor 
Fourth Jafflicial District Qi 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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Davis v. Davis, Memorandum Decision 
Copies of this Decision mailed to: 
Counsel for the Petitioner: 
Richard Nemelka 
6809 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Counsel for the Respondent: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Mailed this d yday of £jCA 2005, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
; 6 ^L 
Court Clerk 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Lisa Davis, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Corey G. Davis, 
Respondent 
Order Modifying Decree of Divorce 
! Case No.: 024400391 
Division VII: Judge James R- Taylor 
The above matter was heard before the Honorable James R. Taylor of Hie Fourth District 
Court on April 21,2005. The Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Richard S. 
Nemelka. The Respondent was present and was represented by his attorney, D. Bruce Oliver. 
Witnesses were sworn and testified and exhibits were admitted. At the close of Respondent's 
presentation of evidence and information regarding a change in circumstances since the original 
decree, the Petitioner made a Motion to Dismiss Respondent1 s claim requesting a change of 
custody. The Court having heard argument on the same and the Court having heretofore made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
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1. Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's claim for a change of custody is granted, 
custody of the minor children shall remain with the Petitioner as stated in the Decree of Divorce. 
2. The Respondent and the Petitioner shall be bound by the relocation statute, Utah Code 
§30-3-37 and §78-45-7.11. 
3. Both parties are ordered to exchange their cuircnt address^ and phone numbers and in 
the event their address or phone number changes to forthwith notify the other party. Further, 
when the Respondent has the minor children for parenting time he shall provide to the Petitioner 
a contact person and phone number. 
4. Respondent is ordered to provide the Petitioner an insurance card for the minor 
children's health insurance and a description of the benefits as well as a copy of his life insurance 
policy or verification of the same as required by the Decree of Divorce. The Respondent shall 
immediately mail the documents by certified mail with a return receipt 
5. Paragraphs 3 and 4 oftheDeare of Wvoro 
medical insurance premiums, non-covered medical expenses and day care expenses. 
6. The Office of Recovery Services may continue to execute upon existing judgments for 
arrearages in child support and alimony for orders signed on April 8,2003 and June 26,2003, 
which encompass October 2002 through April 2003. As of April 21,2005, the total still 
outstanding for these judgments is $2,872.40 in principal and $8.16 in accrued interest for 
alimony and $1,280.-91 in principal and $3.64 in accrued interest for child support 
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7. The child support obligation is reduced to the sum of $1,174.00 beginning in October 
of 2003. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child support in the sum of $1,174.00 
effective October 2003 and continuing thereafter pursuant to the terms of the Decree of Divorce. 
8. Petitioner is granted judgment for arrearages in child support for the time period May 
2003 through April 2005 which includes the change of the child support obligation effective 
October of 2003. Based on evidence received, the total amount of arrearages in child support 
due and owing by the Respondent to the Petitioner for the time period beginning May 2003 
through April 12,2005 is $10.120.25 with interest accruingatthe statutory rate. 
9. It is ordered that the alimony payment of $1,000.00 per mon&L be reduced to $700.00 
per month effective October of 2003 and that those alimony payments shall continue until 
terminated as stated in paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce. 
10. Petitioner is granted judgment for arrearages in alimony for the time period 
beginning May 2003 through April 12,2005 which includes the change of the alimony obligation 
effective October of 2003. Based on evidence received, the total amount of arrearages in 
alimony for time period May 2003 through April 12,2005 is $7.025,91 with interest accruing at 
the statutory rate. 
11. Income withholding relief consistent with Utah Code § 62(a)-l 1-502 and other 
applicable statutes is allowed to etiable the Office of Recovery Services to continue to collect 
child support and alimony obligations from the Respondent 
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12. The Court does not find the Respondent in further contempt because Respondent had 
made substantial payments toward child support and alimony, 
13. Previous contempt sanctions will be held in abeyance so long as the Respondeat pays 
$100.00 per month to Petitioner toward the arrearage judgments for child support and alimony. 
14. This order does not alter previous judgments for attorney fees, included in the Orders 
of April 8,2003, June 26,2003 and December 16,2003, which total $4,000, with interest 
accruing. 
15. Neither party shall be awarded attorney's fees in regard to the Petition and Counter-
Petition to Modify and the trial in this matter. 
16. The Divorce Decree is modified to entitle Respondent to claim the youngest child, 
Cierra as an exemption. The Petitioner may claim the middle child Kayla as an exemption. The 
provision alternating the use of the oldest child, Shian, as an exemption is not modified. This 
Court orders that if one party is unable to make any benefit from any exemptions), then the other 
party is entitled to full use of the exemption(s). 
17. All other provisions of the Decree of Divorce shall remain in full force and effect 
Dated this Flf day of 
Judge Ja&es R. ifcyh^ <& 
FourtiWudicial District Coi 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396 
NEMELKA & NEMELKA 
6806 So. 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801)568-9191 
Fax: (801)568-9196 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LISA DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
COREY G. DAVIS, 
Respondent. 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
Civil No. 024400391 
Commissioner Thomas Patten 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Lisa Davis, by and through her undersigned counsel of record, 
Richard S. Nemelka, and respectfully petitions the Court and alleges as follows: 
1. A Decree of Divorce and a subsequent Order Modifying the Decree were entered in the 
above matter in regard to claiming the children as tax dependents, ordering the Respondent to pay 
debts and cosign for Petitioner to buy a house. 
2. There have been the following changes of circumstances justifying a modification of the 
Orders of the Court. 
A. The Respondent filed bankruptcy and no longer is paying the debts he was ordered 
to pay. 
B. The Petitioner's credit has been ruined by the Respondent's failure to pay the 
debts as ordered by the Court. 
FILED 
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C. The Petitioner has incurred additional expenses for the minor children for extra 
circular activities, school registration and test fees, and other expenses. 
D. The Petitioner has a greater need to claim the minor children as dependants. 
E. Petitioner desires to purchase a house. 
3. It is reasonable that the Petitioner be allowed to claim all of the minor children as 
dependants for tax purposes since Respondent has not cosigned on a loan for the Petitioner to buy 
a house, and no longer has to pay the marital debts.. 
4. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay one-half of the expenses incurred for the children 
for their extra circular activities and school registration and test fees. 
5. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay Petitioner's attorney's fees if this matter is 
contested. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court modify the Decree and subsequent Orders 
consistent with the terms and provisions as stated herein. 
DATED this ^t) day of March, 2008.. 
NEMELKA & NEMELKA 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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LISA DAVIS 
PROSE 
851 NEWBOILD CIRCLE 
MEDVALE, UT 84047 
801-568-2666 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICTOAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
LISA DAVIS, ANSWER TO SUMMONS 
Petitioner, AND PETITIONS THE COURT 
vs. TO MODD7Y DECREE OF DIVORCE 
COREY DAVIS, 
Respondent. Civil No. 024400391 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO COREY DAVIS: 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Lisa Davis and respectfully petitions the court also providing 
answers to said summons, alleges as follows: 
1. A Decree of Divorce and a subsequent Order to Modifying the Decree were entered in 
the above matter in regard to claiming the children as tax dependants, ordering the Respondent to 
pay debts. 
2.. There have been the following changes in circumstances justifying a modification of the 
Orders of the Court 
A. The Respondent filed bankruptcy and no longer is paying debts he was 
ordered to pay. 
B. The Petitioner's credit has been ruined by the Respondents failure to pay the 
debts as ordered by the court. 
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C. The, Respondent was also Ordered in the Decree of Divorce to pay the 
mortgage payment on the house until sold. With the Respondent failing to do so, the house was 
foreclosed upon. 
D. The Respondent was court ordered to pay First National bank of Omaha in the 
Decree of Divorce. Since he filed bankruptcy, this credit card company is presently taking the 
Petitioner to court for the amount of $15,000.00. 
E. The Petitioner has incurred additional expenses for the minor children for extra 
circular activities, school registration and test fees, and other expenses. 
F. The Petitioner has a greater need to claim the minor children as dependants. 
Since the Respondent only visit's the children mice a year. 
G, The Respondent has failed to provide W-2's and tax returns as court ordered. 
H. The Respondent has failed to provide proof of life insurance for the past years. 
3. It is reasonable that the Petitioner be allowed to claim all three as dependants for tax 
purposes. This benefit's the children seeing how the children live with the Petitioner. 
4. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay one-half of the expense incurred for the 
children for their extra circular activities and school registration fees and test fees. 
5. The Petitioner has fulfilled all obligations of Decree of Divorce. 
6. The Respondent has failed to provide a list of eye care providers. Since the Respondent 
is in fact the primary provider. 
7. The Respondent has failed to provide any statements or any list of providers for 
medical and dental under the Respondents insurance plan. Therefore, he should still be 
responsible for one-half. 
8. The Petitioner has provided proof of all payments made by the Petitioner on all 
medical and dental. 
9. The Respondent has also failed to make any payments towards medical and dental bills 
for the year 2009. 
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10. The Respondent was behind $268,00 at the time die airfare tickets were purchased. 
The Respondent had told the children he would pay for the tickets this year because he was behind 
In medical expenses owed the Petitioner. And diey were going to L.A., Calif Not Newport 
Oregon where the Respondent resides. 
11. The Petitioner requests a judgment be made of $494,42. This amount is one-half 
Medical and Dental expenses the Petitioner has already paid for the year 2009. 
12. It is reasonable the Respondent pay for all air fare for the children from this day 
forward. 
13. It is reasonable the Respondent show proof of life insurance coverage for the past 7 
years. Since die Petitioner has not received proof of such. There should be no diange in die 
amount of die life insurance policy. 
14. It is reasonable to adjust the child support amounts with income verifications of taxes. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court modify the Decree and subsequent Orders 
consists with the terms and provisions as stated herein. 
DATED diis _ d l _ <% o f November, 2009. 
LISAT3AVIS 
/si/id. OdinA 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the answer and petition to modify via United States 
mail postage prepaid, on the r V i day of November, 2009, to the following; 
Corey Davis 
11415NECoosSL 
Newport, Oregon, 97365 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LISA DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
COREY G. DAVIS, j 
Respondent. 
1 • ' i • » • • ' 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order Modifying Decree 
Date: February 17, 2010 
Case No. 024400391 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
This matter came before the court for bench trial January 28,2010. Both parties 
represented themselves. This court reviewed the pleadings with the parties, received testimony 
and evidence, and listened to the arguments of the parties. The matter is before the court on 
petitions to modify a divorce decree. Now being fully apprised in the matter, the court enters the 
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and enters a order modifying the decree. 
Findings of Fact 
This matter arises out of a decree which was entered on May 23,2002. The matter has 
been subject to almost continual disagreements, the first petition to modify having been filed 
only five months after the initial decree. This decree was last modified April 10,2006 when the 
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court terminated alimony based upon cohabitation. 
The court discussed at the trial of this matter the difference between an order to show 
cause and a petition to modify. This difference is not one of semantics, and if correctly 
understood by the parties, that understanding may lead to a more orderly future. If either party 
believes that the other party is violating the terms of the decree or any specific modification 
thereof, that party is free to file an order to show cause. An order to show cause will be quickly 
dispatched by a court commissioner. An order to show cause does not need to go through a full-
blown trial. In other words, an order to show cause may be addressed far more efficiently and 
quickly, which will be to all parties' benefit. 
A petition to modify a decree, on the other hand, involves circumstances where the party 
must show that a material change in circumstances has occurred and that the actual terms of the 
decree should be changed. As should be obvious, if one is claiming a violation of a previous 
decree, one would not bring a petition to modify, since the party is not seeking to modify the 
decree, but to enforce it. 
The latest petition to modify was filed April 4,2008 by Mrs. Davis. A counter-petition 
was filed November 5,2009 by Mr. Davis. A document was filed November 23,2009, entitled 
"Answer to summons and petitions the court to modify decree of divorce," which this court takes 
as a counter-petition to the counter-petition. This court finds that the respondent has declared 
bankruptcy and that by virtue of that bankruptcy filing, the creditors are now seeking to recover 
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funds from the petitioner. Although the respondent claims that the petitioner's financial status is 
a function of mismanagement of her own finances, the court was presented with little evidence of 
that being the case. The court finds that the home previously shared by the parties was 
foreclosed upon. The court finds that the initial decree provided that respondent would pay for 
certain debts. The court finds that those debts have not been paid. The court therefore finds that 
although bankruptcy was a right respondent could and did invoke, that by so doing he has 
effectively taken from the petitioner the benefit of her bargain in arriving at the stipulation which 
forms the basis of the original decree. 
This court finds that a material change in circumstances has occurred. One of the 
children has now turned 18. Further, the bankruptcy of the respondent has materially affected the 
financial condition of the petitioner. Finally, issues of school expenses have arisen that did not 
exist when the decree was entered. 
While issues more properly brought in an order to show cause hearing should not be 
addressed in these proceedings, since both parties failed to object to receiving evidence 
concerning the same, this court intends to resolve them now.1 This court finds that air fare has 
been incurred in connection with respondent's exercise of his summer visitation in the amount of 
$543.60, half of which is $271.80. Although these tickets were for a vacation with respondent in 
California, instead of Oregon where he resided, the tickets are still relatively cheap. 
lSee Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). 
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Additionally, there was no evidence presented that on the dates in question a flight to Oregon 
would have been cheaper. Therefore, the court finds that respondent should be reimbursed 
$271.80 from petitioner 
The court finds that under the present decree of the court each party claims one dependent 
on their taxes and then they trade every other year taking a tax deduction for the third child. The 
previously entered decree required the respondent to obtain life insurance in the amount of 
$150,000. However, in the interim time one child has turned 18 years of age. The petitioner on 
behalf of the children has incurred medical expenses of $374.61 (including eyecare) which have 
not been reimbursed by the respondent. A dispute has arisen amongst the parties as to whether 
the petitioner must take the children to an eye care professional covered by respondent's 
insurance plan, or in other words, whether the respondent can force the petitioner to take the 
children to a provider inside the plan when going to a plan provider which will cost more money 
than going to another provider outside the plan. 
The court also finds that the parties incomes have changed significantly, most 
significantly being that of the respondent. The last court order to specifically address the 
incomes of the parties was entered October 26, 2005. The court noted that at the time of the 
decree in May of 2002 the respondent's gross monthly income was $7,000 per month and the 
petitioner's gross monthly income was zero. The respondent had testified that he lost his 
employment, but the court noted that his gross income for the year 2002 was $95,000. In 
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October 2003, the respondent obtained his then-current employment through which he made 
$5,026 per month. The court found that as of October 2003, respondent's income had reduced 
approximately 29%. Although the petitioner was still employed, the court found the petitioner 
could work Ml time and imputed to her the minimum wage of $940 per month. The court 
therefore found it was reasonable that the child support obligation should be reduced to the sum 
of $ 1,174 beginning October 2003. On April 10,2006, the court entered an order modifying the 
decree so that no alimony was owing. 
The court finds that the reasonable expenses the petitioner incurs monthly are $4,027.99 
as testified to in court. The court finds that the reasonable monthly expenses of the respondent 
are $2,224 as testified to in court. The court also finds that, based upon his last paycheck in 
2009, respondent is making $74,979.52 per year, or $6,248 per month. The court received no 
evidence that this amount would likely diminish in the future. Accordingly, this court finds that 
this amount should be used for the determination of child support. 
In contrast, petitioner claims income of $15,286 per year, or $1,273 per month.. 
Minimum wage is currently $7.25 per hour which equates to $15,080. This court agrees with 
previous rulings which have found in this case that minimum wage should be imputed to the 
petitioner. But since she claims that she makes slightly more, the higher amount should be used. 
Using these figures the court determines that the respondent's child support obligation is $1,287 
per month. 
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The court finds that the purpose of life insurance provisions and decrees is to ensure that 
child support obligations will be paid into the future. Multiplying out the monthly obligation of 
the respondent for the remaining time his children will be under the age of 18, the court finds that 
a policy in the amount of $ 150,000 in life insurance is no longer necessary. The court 
specifically finds that a total of $115,000 of life insurance should be in force and that this amount 
will protect the children in this matter as to the support associated with them. The court has 
specifically considered the present value of money. If the respondent were to die today and the 
life insurance were paid and reasonably invested, that investment would produce a net income of 
more than $115,000. 
The court further finds it is reasonable that the petitioner be able to verify the in force 
nature of life insurance policy. Accordingly, respondent to shall be required to submit 
documents proving the enforce nature of a life insurance prop up policy every six months. 
Should respondent failed to provide the documentation, or should the documentation show any 
period of a lapse policy, the court may require the policy to be maintained by the petitioner, with 
a financial obligation for the premium to be assigned to the respondent. Alternatively, the court 
could find respondent in contempt and enter a judgment against the respondent. 
Finally, the $115,000 in life insurance should only list petitioner Lisa Davis and the 
children of this marriage as beneficiaries or payees in the event of respondent's death. If the 
$45,000 policy provided through respondent's employment requires the listing of a spouse, then 
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respondent will need to obtain a stand alone policy in the amount of $115,000. 
The court finds it reasonable that the financial impact of the children should be as little as 
possible. It is not in the interest of any party to waste money. Accordingly, the petitioner is 
required to use eye care professionals within respondent's health insurance plan, unless she can 
obtain those services and products cheaper through another source. If they are obtained from a 
cheaper source, respondent is still responsible for one half of the expenses related to vision care.2 
The court finds that because of the financial impact the bankruptcy has had upon the 
petitioner, the petitioner should be able to claim all the tax exemptions for all the children. 
Accordingly, the wife is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties. The 
husband has the option of paying the wife any tax benefit she would derive from claiming the 
minor children as exemptions and claiming exemption himself, if he complies with the following 
requirements: 
A* He notifies the wife on or before February 15 of each year; 
B. He is current in his child support obligation for the preceding calendar year; 
C. He pays the wife the tax benefit she would derive from claiming the exemptions; 
and 
D. He pays for an accountant to determine what the tax consequences would be for 
2The court has noted an assertion by respondent that he should be freed from an 
obligation in the decree to co-sign on a home loan should the petitioner attempt to purchase a 
home. The court was provided no basis to change that provision of the decree. Therefore, the 
co-sign obligation remains in full force and effect. 
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the parties. 
When the respondent has met the aforementioned conditions, the petitioner shall immediately 
sign and return the documents required by the Internal Revenue Service to permit the respondent 
to claim the exemptions for the applicable tax year. 
As the court indicated to the parties at trial, a question existed as to whether the court 
could consider the respondent's post-decree filing of bankruptcy and reconsider the obligations 
of the parties. The answer under Utah law is "Yes." In the case of Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 
P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988), the court was faced with a situation where a party to a divorce 
declared business and personal bankruptcy and ceased making payments for the benefit of the ex-
spouse, thus causing her to assume those financial responsibilities. In the initial stipulations 
before the court, the wife had expressly waived any right to receive alimony. The Utah Court of 
Appeals looked to the case of Beckman v. Beckman, 685 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1984) where the Utah 
Supreme Court examined another bankruptcy situation in a divorce case. In Beckman, the 
defendant was discharged in bankruptcy subsequent to a divorce decree in which he was ordered 
to make payments on debts and to hold his wife harmless from them as described in a settlement 
agreement. The trial court found that the obligation to pay marital debts was a support obligation 
which was not dischargeable by bankruptcy. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. 
Essentially, the courts are enforcing decrees under a contract theory, looking at the 
agreement between the parties to a divorce. When parties negotiate and agree upon terms to 
8 
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settle their divorce and entry into the stipulation incorporating those terms, the stipulation is an 
enforceable agreement. When a respondent such as Mr. Davis agrees to assume and pay certain 
debts for the benefit of a petitioner such as Mrs. Davis, that is a promise upon which the 
petitioner Gan rely* While the creditors no longer can go against the respondent because of the 
bankruptcy, the petitioner can because the original decree in this matter placed upon respondent 
obligation to pay those bills. 
The Kinsman court explained: 
When defendant willfully avoided his required performance through 
bankruptcy, he failed to perform the condition precedent. Having failed 
to perform, he now seeks to enforce the agreement against plaintiff. 
Such a result will not be tolerated. Failure of the material condition 
precedent relieves the other party of any obligation to perform. The 
stipulated agreement is no longer enforceable against plaintiff. The 
court is placed in the position as if there had been no agreement and no 
distribution of property. The court should look to the present condition 
and needs of the parties and enter judgment accordingly. 
Mat 213. 
Thus, in the present circumstances, this court must look to the current financial needs of 
the parties and make a determination of financial matters. This court finds that the bankruptcy 
filed by respondent is a breach of the condition of the original stipulation and decree that he pay 
certain marital debts. The only remedy sought by the petitioner is that she receive the financial 
benefit of the tax deduction. The court agrees this will be a just and fair result given that 
respondent has failed to perform. 
9 
75 
The court has also noted that the present decree does not require the parties to mediate 
before bringing matters before the court. This should be changed. For any issues in the future, 
the parties must first submit the matter to good faith mediation before bringing the matter before 
the court. Additionally, where the decree provides for reimbursement, any party claiming 
reimbursement must submit evidence of incurring bills within 30 days of the bill being incurred, 
or the claim will be waived. The party need not show that the bill has actually been paid, but 
need only show that it has been incurred. 
The evidence at trial was insufficient for this court to determine attorney fees in this 
matter, specifically whether the attorney fees are related to the issues which have been 
adjudicated here. Accordingly, the court does not find that attorney fees should be awarded in 
this case. 
Conclusions of Law 
Based upon the findings above, the court concludes that: 
1. The petitioner on behalf of the children has incurred medical expenses one half of 
which is $374.6L 
2. Respondent should be reimbursed $271.80 from petitioner for one half of the 
travel expenses for respondent's visitation. 
3. The medical expenses and travel expenses offset each other. Accordingly, 
judgment will be entered against respondent Mr. Davis in the amount of $102.81. 
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4. The respondent's child support obligation is $1,287 per month retroactive to April 
A; 2008; the date the petition .to modify was-filed. 
5. Petitioner is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties. The 
husband has the option of paying the wife any tax benefit she would derive from 
claiming the minor children as exemptions and claiming exemption himself, if he 
complies with the following requirements: 
A. He notifies the wife on or before February 15 of each year; 
B. He is current in his child support obligation for the preceding calendar 
year; 
C. He pays the wife the tax benefit she would derive from claiming the 
exemptions; and 
D. He pays for an accountant to determine what the tax consequences would 
be for the parties. 
When the respondent has met the aforementioned conditions, the petitioner shall 
immediately sign and return the documents required by the Internal Revenue 
Service to permit the respondent to claim the exemptions for the applicable tax 
year. 
6. $ 115,000 of life insurance shall be in force at all times. Respondent shall be 
required to submit documents proving the in force nature of a life insurance policy 
every six months. Should respondent fail to provide the documentation, or should 
the documentation show any period of a lapse policy, the court may require the 
policy to be maintained by the petitioner, with a financial obligation for the 
11 
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premium to be assigned to the respondent. Alternatively, the respondent may be 
held in contempt for failure to keep a life insurance policy or policies in the 
amount of $ 115,000 in place. The $ 115,000 in life insurance should only list 
petitioner Lisa Davis and the children of this marriage as beneficiaries or payees 
in the event of respondent's death. If the $45,000 policy provided through 
respondent's employment requires the listing of a spouse, then respondent will 
need to obtain a stand alone policy in the amount of $ 115,000. 
7. The petitioner is required to use eye care professionals within respondent's health 
insurance plan, unless she can obtain those services and products cheaper through 
another source. If they are obtained from a cheaper source, respondent is still 
responsible for one half of the expenses related to vision care. 
8. The decree is hereby modified to require respondent to reimburse petitioner for 
one half of reasonable school expenses. 
9. For any issues in the future, the parties must first submit the matter to good faith 
mediation before bringing the matter before the court. Additionally, where the 
decree provides for reimbursement, any party claiming reimbursement must 
submit evidence of incurring bills within 30 days of the bill being incurred, or the 
claim will be waived. The party need not show that the bill has actually been 
paid, but need only show that the expense has been incurred. 
12 
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10. Attorney fees are denied. 
11. . . All other claims for relief are denied. 
The decree is so modified. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated February 17,2010. «&!•&& 
Judge David N. Moi 
Fourth Judicial Distii 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LISA DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
COREY DAVIS, 
Respondent 
ORDER ON MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE 
DECREE 
(JANUARY 28,2010) 
Civil No. 024400391 
Judge David N. Mortensen 
This Court, having heard this matter on January 28,2010, and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgment is entered against Respondent in the amount of $ 102.81. This amount 
represents the difference between the amount Petitioner has incurred in medical expenses, one 
half of which is $374.61, and the amount Respondent has incurred in travel expenses, one half of 
which is $271.80. 
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2. Respondent's child support obligation is raised to $ 1,287 per month, retroactive to 
April 4,2008. 
3. Petitioner is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties. The 
husband has the option of paying the wife any tax benefit she would derive from claiming the 
minor children as exemptions and claiming exemption himself, if he complies with the following 
requirements: 
A. He notifies the wife on or before February 15 of each year, 
B. He is current in his child support obligation for the 
preceding calendar year; 
C. He pays the wife the tax benefit she would derive from 
claiming the exemptions; and 
D. He pays for an accountant to determine what the tax 
consequences would be for the parties. 
4. When Respondent has met the aforementioned conditions regarding claiming the 
tax exemption, Petitioner shall immediately sign and return the documents required by the 
Internal Revenue Service to permit the Respondent to claim the exemptions for the applicable tax 
year. 
5. Respondent maintains $115,000 of life insurance in force at all times. 
Respondent is required to submit documents providing the in force nature of a life insurance 
policy every six months. Should Respondent fail to provide the documentation, or should the 
documentation show any period of a lapse policy, the court may require the policy to be 
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maintained by the Petitioner, with a financial obligation for the premium to be assigned to the 
Respondent. Alternatively, the Respondent may be held in contempt for failure to keep a life 
insurance policy or policies in the amount of $115,000 in place. 
6. The $115,000 in life insurance only list Petitioner Lisa Davis and the children of 
this marriage as beneficiaries or payees in the event of Respondent's death. If the $45,000 policy 
provided through Respondent's employment requires the listing of a spouse, then Respondent 
must obtain a stand alone policy in the amount of $ 115,000. 
7. Petitioner is required to use eye care professionals within Respondent's health 
insurance plan, unless she can obtain those services and products cheaper through another 
source. If they are obtained from a cheaper source, Respondent is still responsible for one half of 
the expenses related to vision care. 
8. The decree is hereby modified to require Respondent to reimburse petitioner for 
one half of reasonable school expenses. 
9. For any issues in the future, the parties must first submit the matter to good faith 
mediation before bringing the matter before the court 
10. Where the decree provides for reimbursement, any party claiming reimbursement 
must submit evidence of incurring bills within 30 days of the bill being incurred, or the claim 
will be waived. The party need not show that the bill has actually been paid, but need only show 
that the expense has been incurred. 
11. Attorneys fees are denied. 
12. All other claims for relief are denied. 
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Dated this ^ 4?day of April, 2010. 
Approved as to form: 
David Hartwig 
Attorney for Respondent 
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